Lunch with Lord Robin Butler

On April 25, I had lunch with Lord Butler, the Baron Butler of Rockwell, Master of University College Oxford and distinguished British civil servant, with a small panel from the University of Arkansas Honors College. Lord Butler's most recent work of note was leading the British Government's inquiry into pre-Iraq War intelligence, which came to be called the "Butler Report."

Our conversation was to be primarily on the topic of law and intelligence and the corrupt data that predicated the joint US-UK invasion of Iraq in 2003. As we sat down over a simple meal of pasta primavera and salad, Mr. Butler introduces himself by promoting Oxford and expressing his excitement to be managing University College where he studied. For a politician, his British accent is warm and his voice commands the room without any sound of confrontation. With his rosy complexion, Lord Butler has almost a grandfatherly energy.

After our introductions, he turns to the topic of pre-Iraq intelligence. He places responsibility for the government's assertion that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction on a combination of confirmation bias, a belief between intelligence agencies that each had secret and superior intelligence confirming WMDs, and an assumption that if Mr. Hussein previously owned a WMD arsenal he must have retained it until 2003.

Another dinner guest asks why Mr. Hussein simply didn't expose his lack of WMDs. Lord Butler responds that "the Iraqis weren't the type to make reasonable decisions" and related a story he discovered, when interviewing a farmer, of the Iraqi casualness in burying objects in the desert, including a MIG fighter jet which when uncovered was completely inoperable from literally sand desertification. He leaves open the possibility that WMD's may exist along with other government secrets somewhere in an Iraqi sand dune.

I turn the subject to the consequences for British government, specifically soon to be Prime Minister Gordon Brown. Lord Butler argues that Brown has successfully separated himself from any intelligence debacles and that he believes it will not harm Brown's ability to govern. Brown, he calls, an "inward looking and deeply conscientious man" but Butler worries that "Brown does not have personality to craft foreign policy." Butler than goes on to describe Tony Blair as a trivial thinker, although a charismatic speaker, as a contrast to Brown. At this point, I've become aware of Butler's conservative political leanings, which again surfaced when we moved off topic to the subject of the French Election. On which, He voices his intellectual support for Nicholas Sarkozy and calls Ségolène Royal's policies "widely empty, although she is attractive, (pause) physically, I mean."

Not wanting to be stuck in a European political debate, I turn the conversation back to Britain's international involvement. I ask if "Brown's reconciliation and development policy of increasing foreign aid is authentic and effective at engaging terrorism and rogue nations." In his response, Butler avoids the question of effectiveness, but says that Brown is "completely authentic and believes in improving Africa" and thinks that Britain's focus will move away from East Asia and the Middle East during Brown's administration. A policy that Butler seems to believe will be a symptom of weakness from Brown and factor into an inability to confront more serious international problems.

I ask if reducing poverty is a key to confronting the fundamental basis of terrorism "why don't the forces in Afghanistan allow farmers to grow opium with regulations and taxes, instead of burning their sole source of economic income? "Its true, says Butler as he negatively shakes his head and forks another bite, that British soldiers will not be as likely die in Afghanistan if opium was legally grown and that the Taliban would lose their economic power, but permitting opium crops is just not a solution that the UK or any other nation can allow.

Finally, Butler introduces the topic of immigration into the UK. He says that immigration has been positive for Britain, and that the publics' opinion is not against more immigration, even from Turkey. "Brown will work to get Turkey into the EU, unlike the French, which should be good for everyone," said Butler. I am pleased to see his positive opinion on EU enlargement and to hear about the UK's optimism towards Turkey's entrance. I ask if he expects secular Turks to help moderate the political climate where fundamentalist North African immigrants have polarized the nation. He shakes his head in agreement, but seems to be a little tired and more concentrated on his food. Our table's conversation begins to drift and Dean McMath interrupts to thank Lord Butler. Before we go, Lord Butler energy picks up and he takes a few photographs. As we shake hands and leave the table, I feel a little more like the world's policy makers, while experienced and intelligent, make decisions with nearly the same information that is available for the rest of us.